Modelling the impact of reopening schools in early 2021 in the presence of the new SARS-CoV-2 variant and with roll-out of vaccination against COVID-19 (preprint)

Background Following the resurgence of the COVID-19 epidemic in the UK in late 2020 and the emergence of the new variant of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, B.1.1.7, a third national lockdown was imposed from January 5, 2021. Following the decline of COVID-19 cases over the remainder of January 2021, it is important to assess the conditions under which reopening schools from early March is likely to lead to resurgence of the epidemic. This study models the impact of a partial national lockdown with social distancing measures enacted in communities and workplaces under different strategies of reopening schools from March 8, 2021 and compares it to the impact of continual full national lockdown remaining until April 19, 2021. Methods We used our previously published model, Covasim, to model the emergence of B.1.1.7 over September 1, 2020 to January 31, 2021. We extended the model to incorporate the impacts of the roll-out of a two-dose vaccine against COVID-19, assuming 200,000 daily doses of the vaccine in people 75 years or older with vaccination that offers 95% reduction in disease acquisition and 10% reduction of transmission blocking. We used the model, calibrated until January 25, 2021, to simulate the impact of a full national lockdown (FNL) with schools closed until April 19, 2021 versus four different partial national lockdown (PNL) scenarios with different elements of schooling open: 1) staggered PNL with primary schools and exam-entry years (years 11 and 13) returning on March 8, 2021 and the rest of the schools years on March 15, 2020; 2) full-return PNL with both primary and secondary schools returning on March 8, 2021; 3) primary-only PNL with primary schools and exam critical years (Y11 and Y13) going back only on March 8, 2021 with the rest of the secondary schools back on April 19, 2021 and 4) part-Rota PNL with both primary and secondary schools returning on March 8, 2021 with primary schools remaining open continuously but secondary schools on a two-weekly rota-system with years alternating between a fortnight of face-to-face and remote learning until April 19, 2021. Across all scenarios, we projected the number of new daily cases, cumulative deaths and effective reproduction number R until April 30, 2020. Results Our calibration across different scenarios is consistent with the new variant B.1.1.7 being around 60% more transmissible. Strict social distancing measures, i.e. national lockdowns, are required to contain the spread of the virus and control the hospitalisations and deaths during January and February 2021. The national lockdown will reduce the number of cases by early March levels similar to those seen in October with R also falling and remaining below 1 during the lockdown. Infections start to increase when schools open but if other parts of society remain closed this resurgence is not sufficient to bring R above 1. Reopening primary schools and exam critical years only or having primary schools open continuously with secondary schools on rotas will lead to lower increases in cases and R than if all schools open. Under the current vaccination assumptions and across the set of scenarios considered, R would increase above 1 if society reopens simultaneously, simulated here from April 19, 2021.Findings Our findings suggest that stringent measures are necessary to mitigate the increase in cases and bring R below 1 over January and February 2021. It is plausible that a PNL with schools partially open from March 8, 2021 and the rest of the society remaining closed until April 19, 2021 may keep R below 1, with some increase evident in infections compared to continual FNL until April 19, 2021. Reopening society in mid-April, with the vaccination strategy we model, could push R above 1 and induce a surge in infections, but the effect of vaccination may be able to control this in future depending on the transmission blocking properties of the vaccines.

Controlling COVID-19 via test-trace-quarantine (preprint)

Initial COVID-19 containment in the United States focused on limiting mobility, including school and workplace closures. However, these interventions have had enormous societal and economic costs. Here we demonstrate the feasibility of an alternative control strategy, test-trace-quarantine: routine testing of primarily symptomatic individuals, tracing and testing their known contacts, and placing their contacts in quarantine. We performed this analysis using Covasim, an open-source agent-based model, which was calibrated to detailed demographic, mobility, and epidemiological data for the Seattle region from January through June 2020. With current levels of mask use and schools remaining closed, we found that high but achievable levels of testing and tracing are sufficient to maintain epidemic control even under a return to full workplace and community mobility and with low vaccine coverage. The easing of mobility restrictions in June 2020 and subsequent scale-up of testing and tracing programs through September provided real-world validation of our predictions. Although we show that test-trace-quarantine can control the epidemic in both theory and practice, its success is contingent on high testing and tracing rates, high quarantine compliance, relatively short testing and tracing delays, and moderate to high mask use. Thus, in order for test-trace-quarantine to control transmission with a return to high mobility, strong performance in all aspects of the program is required.

Modelling the impact of reopening schools in early 2021 in the presence of the new SARS-CoV-2 variant and with roll-out of vaccination against COVID-19 (preprint)

Background Following the resurgence of the COVID-19 epidemic in the UK in late 2020 and the emergence of the new variant of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, B.1.1.7, a third national lockdown was imposed from January 5, 2021. Following the decline of COVID-19 cases over the remainder of January 2021, it is important to assess the conditions under which reopening schools from early March is likely to lead to resurgence of the epidemic. This study models the impact of a partial national lockdown with social distancing measures enacted in communities and workplaces under different strategies of reopening schools from March 8, 2021 and compares it to the impact of continual full national lockdown remaining until April 19, 2021. Methods We used our previously published model, Covasim, to model the emergence of B.1.1.7 over September 1, 2020 to January 31, 2021. We extended the model to incorporate the impacts of the roll-out of a two-dose vaccine against COVID-19, assuming 200,000 daily doses of the vaccine in people 75 years or older with vaccination that offers 95% reduction in disease acquisition and 10% reduction of transmission blocking. We used the model, calibrated until January 25, 2021, to simulate the impact of a full national lockdown (FNL) with schools closed until April 19, 2021 versus four different partial national lockdown (PNL) scenarios with different elements of schooling open: 1) staggered PNL with primary schools and exam-entry years (years 11 and 13) returning on March 8, 2021 and the rest of the schools years on March 15, 2020; 2) full-return PNL with both primary and secondary schools returning on March 8, 2021; 3) primary-only PNL with primary schools and exam critical years (Y11 and Y13) going back only on March 8, 2021 with the rest of the secondary schools back on April 19, 2021 and 4) part-Rota PNL with both primary and secondary schools returning on March 8, 2021 with primary schools remaining open continuously but secondary schools on a two-weekly rota-system with years alternating between a fortnight of face-to-face and remote learning until April 19, 2021. Across all scenarios, we projected the number of new daily cases, cumulative deaths and effective reproduction number R until April 30, 2020. Results Our calibration across different scenarios is consistent with the new variant B.1.1.7 being around 60% more transmissible. Strict social distancing measures, i.e. national lockdowns, are required to contain the spread of the virus and control the hospitalisations and deaths during January and February 2021. The national lockdown will reduce the number of cases by early March levels similar to those seen in October with R also falling and remaining below 1 during the lockdown. Infections start to increase when schools open but if other parts of society remain closed this resurgence is not sufficient to bring R above 1. Reopening primary schools and exam critical years only or having primary schools open continuously with secondary schools on rotas will lead to lower increases in cases and R than if all schools open. Under the current vaccination assumptions and across the set of scenarios considered, R would increase above 1 if society reopens simultaneously, simulated here from April 19, 2021. Findings Our findings suggest that stringent measures are necessary to mitigate the increase in cases and bring R below 1 over January and February 2021. It is plausible that a PNL with schools partially open from March 8, 2021 and the rest of the society remaining closed until April 19, 2021 may keep R below 1, with some increase evident in infections compared to continual FNL until April 19, 2021. Reopening society in mid-April, with the vaccination strategy we model, could push R above 1 and induce a surge in infections, but the effect of vaccination may be able to control this in future depending on the transmission blocking properties of the vaccines.

Preventing a cluster from becoming a new wave in settings with zero community COVID-19 cases (preprint)

In settings with zero community transmission, any new SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks are likely to be the result of random incursions. The level of restrictions in place at the time of the incursion is likely to considerably affect possible outbreak trajectories. We used an agent-based model to investigate the relationship between ongoing restrictions and behavioural factors, and the probability of an incursion causing an outbreak and the resulting growth rate. We applied our model to the state of Victoria, Australia, which has reached zero community transmission as of November 2020. We found that a future incursion has a 45% probability of causing an outbreak (defined as a 7-day average of >5 new cases per day within 60 days) if no restrictions were in place, decreasing to 23% with a mandatory masks policy, density restrictions on venues such as restaurants, and if employees worked from home where possible. A drop in community symptomatic testing rates was associated with up to a 10-percentage point increase in outbreak probability, highlighting the importance of maintaining high testing rates as part of a suppression strategy. Because the chance of an incursion occurring is closely related to border controls, outbreak risk management strategies require an integrated approaching spanning border controls, ongoing restrictions, and plans for response. Each individual restriction or control strategy reduces the risk of an outbreak. They can be traded off against each other, but if too many are removed there is a danger of accumulating an unsafe level of risk. The outbreak probabilities estimated in this study are of particular relevance in assessing the downstream risks associated with increased international travel.

Lessons learned from Vietnam’s COVID-19 response: the role of adaptive behavior change and testing in epidemic control (preprint)

Background Vietnam has emerged as one of the world’s leading success stories in responding to COVID-19. After prolonged zero-low transmission, a summer outbreak of unknown source at Da Nang caused the country’s first COVID-19 deaths, but was quickly suppressed. Vietnam recently reopened its borders to international travelers. Understanding the attendant risks and how to minimize them is crucial as Vietnam moves into this new phase. Methods We create an agent-based model of COVID-19 in Vietnam, using regional testing data and a detailed linelist of the 1,014 COVID-19 cases, including 35 deaths, identified across Vietnam. We investigate the Da Nang outbreak, and quantify the risk of another outbreak under different assumptions about behavioral/policy responses and ongoing testing. Results The Da Nang outbreak, although rapidly contained once detected, nevertheless caused significant community transmission before it was detected; higher symptomatic testing could have mitigated this. If testing levels do not increase, the adoption of past policies in response to newly-detected cases may reduce the size of potential outbreaks but will not prevent them. Compared to a baseline symptomatic testing rate of 10%, we estimate half as many infections under a 20% testing rate, and a quarter as many with 40-50% testing rates, over the four months following border reopenings. Conclusions Vietnam’s success in controlling COVID-19 is largely attributable to its rapid response to detected outbreaks, but the speed of response could be improved even further with higher levels of symptomatic testing.

Robust test and trace strategies can prevent COVID-19 resurgences: a case study from New South Wales, Australia (preprint)

Background: The early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes the disease, has the potential to spread exponentially. Therefore, as long as a substantial proportion of the population remains susceptible to infection, the potential for new epidemic waves persists even in settings with low numbers of active COVID-19 infections, unless sufficient countermeasures are in place. In this study, we examine the Australian state of New South Wales, a setting with prolonged low transmission, high mobility, non-universal mask usage, and a well-functioning test-and-trace system. We investigate how vulnerable the state would be to resurgences in COVID-19 transmission under variations in the levels of testing, tracing, and mask usage. Methods: We use a stochastic agent-based model, calibrated to the New South Wales epidemic and policy environment, to simulate possible epidemic outcomes over October 1 to December 31, 2020, under a range of assumptions about contact tracing efficacy, testing rates, and mask uptake. Results: We find that the relative impact of masks is greatest when testing and tracing rates are lower (and vice versa). With very high testing rates (90% of people with symptoms, plus 90% of people with a known history of contact with a confirmed case), we estimate that the epidemic would remain under control until at least the end of 2020, with as little as 70-110 new infections estimated over October 1 to December 31 under high mask uptake scenarios, or 340-1400 without masks, depending on the efficacy of community contact tracing. However, across comparable levels of mask uptake and contact tracing, the number of infections over this period would be up to 6 times higher if the testing rate was 80% instead of 90%, 17 times higher if the testing rate was 65%, or more than 100 times higher with a 50% testing rate. Conclusions: Our work suggests that testing, tracing and masks can all be effective means of controlling transmission in dynamic community settings. A multifaceted strategy that combines all three, alongside continued hygiene and distancing protocols, is likely to be the most robust means of controlling community-based transmission of SARS-CoV-2.

The potential contribution of face coverings to the control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in schools and broader society in the UK: a modelling study (preprint)

Recent findings suggest that an adequate test-trace-isolate (TTI) strategy is needed to prevent a secondary COVID-19 wave with the reopening of society in the UK. Here we assess the potential importance of mandatory masks in the parts of community and in secondary schools. We show that, assuming current TTI levels, adoption of masks in secondary schools in addition to community settings can reduce the size of a second wave, but will not prevent it; more testing of symptomatic people, tracing and isolating of their contacts is also needed. To avoid a second wave, with masks mandatory in secondary schools and in certain community settings, under current tracing levels, 68% or 46% of those with symptomatic infection would need to be tested if masks' effective coverage were 15% or 30% respectively, compared to 76% and 57% if masks are mandated in community settings but not secondary schools.

Schools are not islands: Balancing COVID-19 risk and educational benefits using structural and temporal countermeasures (preprint)

Background: School closures around the world contributed to reducing the transmission of COVID-19. In the face of significant uncertainty around the epidemic impact of in-person schooling, policymakers, parents, and teachers are weighing the risks and benefits of returning to in-person education. In this context, we examined the impact of different school reopening scenarios on transmission within and outside of schools and on the share of school days that would need to be spent learning at a distance. Methods: We used an agent-based mathematical model of COVID-19 transmission and interventions to quantify the impact of school reopening on disease transmission and the extent to which school-based interventions could mitigate epidemic spread within and outside schools. We compared seven school reopening strategies that vary the degree of countermeasures within schools to mitigate COVID-19 transmission, including the use of face masks, physical distancing, classroom cohorting, screening, testing, and contact tracing, as well as schedule changes to reduce the number of students in school. We considered three scenarios for the size of the epidemic in the two weeks prior to school reopening: 20, 50, or 110 detected cases per 100,000 individuals and assumed the epidemic was slowly declining with full school closures. For each scenario, we calculated the percentage of schools that would have at least one person arriving at school with an active COVID-19 infection on the first day of school; the percentage of in-person school days that would be lost due to scheduled distance learning, symptomatic screening or quarantine; the cumulative infection rate for students, staff and teachers over the first three months of school; and the effective reproduction number averaged over the first three months of school within the community. Findings: In-person schooling poses significant risks to students, teachers, and staff. On the first day of school, 5-42% of schools would have at least one person arrive at school with active COVID-19, depending on the incidence of COVID in the community and the school type. However, reducing class sizes via A/B school scheduling, combined with an incremental approach that returns elementary schools in person and keeps all other students remote, can mitigate COVID transmission. In the absence of any countermeasures in schools, we expect 6-25% of teaching and non-teaching staff and 4-20% of students to be infected with COVID in the first three months of school, depending upon the case detection rate. Schools can lower this risk to as low as 0.2% for staff and 0.1% for students by returning elementary schools with a hybrid schedule while all other grades continue learning remotely. However, this approach would require 60-85% of all school days to be spent at home. Despite the significant risks to the school population, reopening schools would not significantly increase community-wide transmission, provided sufficient countermeasures are implemented in schools. Interpretation: Without extensive countermeasures, school reopening may lead to an increase in infections and a significant number of re-closures as cases are identified among staff and students. Returning elementary schools only with A/B scheduling is the lowest risk school reopening strategy that includes some in-person learning.

The role of masks in reducing the risk of new waves of COVID-19 in low transmission settings: a modeling study (preprint)

Objectives: To evaluate the risk of a new wave of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in a setting with ongoing low transmission, high mobility, and an effective test-and-trace system, under different assumptions about mask uptake. Design: We used a stochastic agent-based microsimulation model to create multiple simulations of possible epidemic trajectories that could eventuate over a five-week period following prolonged low levels of community transmission. Setting: We calibrated the model to the epidemiological and policy environment in New South Wales, Australia, at the end of August 2020. Participants: None Intervention: From September 1, 2020, we ran the stochastic model with the same initial conditions (i.e., those prevailing at August 31, 2020), and analyzed the outputs of the model to determine the probability of exceeding a given number of new diagnoses and active cases within five weeks, under three assumptions about future mask usage: a baseline scenario of 30% uptake, a scenario assuming no mask usage, and a scenario assuming mandatory mask usage with near-universal uptake (95%). Main outcome measure: Probability of exceeding a given number of new diagnoses and active cases within five weeks. Results: The policy environment at the end of August is sufficient to slow the rate of epidemic growth, but may not stop the epidemic from growing: we estimate a 20% chance that NSW will be diagnosing at least 50 new cases per day within five weeks from the date of this analysis. Mandatory mask usage would reduce this to 6-9%. Conclusions: Mandating the use of masks in community settings would significantly reduce the risk of epidemic resurgence.

Controlling COVID-19 via test-trace-quarantine (preprint)

COVID-19 containment efforts in the United States so far have largely focused on physical distancing, including school and workplace closures. However, these interventions have come at an enormous societal and economic cost. Here, we use an agent-based model, calibrated to detailed demographic, mobility, and epidemiological data for the Seattle region, to investigate the feasibility of alternative control strategies, focusing on "test-trace-quarantine": a combination of (a) routine testing of primarily symptomatic individuals, (b) tracing and testing their known contacts, and (c) placing their contacts in quarantine. We assess the requirements for implementing this strategy, including its robustness to low compliance, delays, and other factors such as variability in overall transmission rates. We find that for the Seattle setting, if mask compliance remains high and schools remain closed, realistic levels of testing and tracing are sufficient to maintain epidemic control under a return to full workplace and community mobility.

Modelling the impact of reducing control measures on the COVID-19 pandemic in a low transmission setting (preprint)

Aims: We assessed COVID-19 epidemic risks associated with relaxing a set of physical distancing restrictions in the state of Victoria, Australia - a setting with low community transmission - in line with a national framework that aims to balance sequential policy relaxations with longer-term public health and economic need. Methods: An agent-based model, Covasim, was calibrated to the local COVID-19 epidemiological and policy environment. Contact networks were modelled to capture transmission risks in households, schools and workplaces, and a variety of community spaces (e.g. public transport, parks, bars, cafes/restaurants) and activities (e.g. community or professional sports, large events). Policy changes that could prevent or reduce transmission in specific locations (e.g. opening/closing businesses) were modelled in the context of interventions that included testing, contact tracing (including via a smartphone app), and quarantine. Results: Policy changes leading to the gathering of large, unstructured groups with unknown individuals (e.g. bars opening, increased public transport use) posed the greatest risk, while policy changes leading to smaller, structured gatherings with known individuals (e.g. small social gatherings) posed least risk. In the model, epidemic impact following some policy changes took more than two months to occur. Model outcomes support continuation of working from home policies to reduce public transport use, and risk mitigation strategies in the context of social venues opening, such as >30% population-uptake of a contact-tracing app, physical distancing policies within venues reducing transmissibility by >40%, or patron identification records being kept to enable >60% contact tracing. Conclusions: In a low transmission setting, care should be taken to avoid lifting sequential COVID-19 policy restrictions within short time periods, as it could take more than two months to detect the consequences of any changes. These findings have implications for other settings with low community transmission where governments are beginning to lift restrictions.

Determining the optimal strategy for reopening schools, work and society in the UK: balancing earlier opening and the impact of test and trace strategies with the risk of occurrence of a secondary COVID-19 pandemic wave (preprint)

Background In order to slow down the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus causing the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK government has imposed strict physical distancing (lockdown) measures including school 'dismissals' since 23 March 2020. As evidence is emerging that these measures may have slowed the spread of the pandemic, it is important to assess the impact of any changes in strategy, including scenarios for school reopening and broader relaxation of social distancing. This work uses an individual-based model to predict the impact of a suite of possible strategies to reopen schools in the UK, including that currently proposed by the UK government. Methods We use Covasim, a stochastic agent-based model for transmission of COVID-19, calibrated to the UK epidemic. The model describes individuals' contact networks stratified as household, school, work and community layers, and uses demographic and epidemiological data from the UK. We simulate a range of different school reopening strategies with a society-wide relaxation of lockdown measures and in the presence of different non-pharmaceutical interventions, to estimate the number of new infections, cumulative cases and deaths, as well as the effective reproduction number with different strategies. To account for uncertainties within the stochastic simulation, we also simulated different levels of infectiousness of children and young adults under 20 years old compared to older ages. Findings We found that with increased levels of testing of people (between 25% and 72% of symptomatic people tested at some point during an active COVID-19 infection depending on scenarios) and effective contact-tracing and isolation for infected individuals, an epidemic rebound may be prevented across all reopening scenarios, with the effective reproduction number (R) remaining below one and the cumulative number of new infections and deaths significantly lower than they would be if testing did not increase. If UK schools reopen in phases from June 2020, prevention of a second wave would require testing 51% of symptomatic infections, tracing of 40% of their contacts, and isolation of symptomatic and diagnosed cases. However, without such measures, reopening of schools together with gradual relaxing of the lockdown measures are likely to induce a secondary pandemic wave, as are other scenarios for reopening. When infectiousness of <20 year olds was varied from 100% to 50% of that of older ages, our findings remained unchanged. Interpretation To prevent a secondary COVID-19 wave, relaxation of social distancing including reopening schools in the UK must be implemented alongside an active large-scale population-wide testing of symptomatic individuals and effective tracing of their contacts, followed by isolation of symptomatic and diagnosed individuals. Such combined measures have a greater likelihood of controlling the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and preventing a large number of COVID-19 deaths than reopening schools and society with the current level of implementation of testing and isolation of infected individuals.

Covasim: an agent-based model of COVID-19 dynamics and interventions (preprint)

The COVID-19 pandemic has created an urgent need for models that can project epidemic trends, explore intervention scenarios, and estimate resource needs. Here we describe the methodology of Covasim (COVID-19 Agent-based Simulator), an open-source model developed to help address these questions. Covasim includes demographic information on age structure and population size; realistic transmission networks in different social layers, including households, schools, workplaces, and communities; age-specific disease outcomes; and intrahost viral dynamics, including viral-load-based transmissibility. Covasim also supports an extensive set of interventions, including non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as physical distancing, hygiene measures, and protective equipment; and testing interventions, such as symptomatic and asymptomatic testing, isolation, contact tracing, and quarantine. These interventions can incorporate the effects of delays, loss-to-follow-up, micro-targeting, and other factors. In collaboration with local health agencies and policymakers, Covasim has already been applied to examine disease dynamics and policy options in Africa, Europe, Oceania, and North America.

Seeding COVID-19 across sub-Saharan Africa: an analysis of reported importation events across 40 countries (preprint)

BackgroundThe first case of COVID-19 in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was reported by Nigeria on February 27, 2020. While case counts in the entire region remain considerably less than those being reported by individual countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas, SSA countries remain vulnerable to COVID morbidity and mortality due to systemic healthcare weaknesses, less financial resources and infrastructure to address the new crisis, and untreated comorbidities. Variation in preparedness and response capacity as well as in data availability has raised concerns about undetected transmission events. MethodsConfirmed cases reported by SSA countries were line-listed to capture epidemiological details related to early transmission events into and within countries. Data were retrieved from publicly available sources, including institutional websites, situation reports, press releases, and social media accounts, with supplementary details obtained from news articles. A data availability score was calculated for each imported case in terms of how many indicators (sex, age, travel history, date of arrival in country, reporting date of confirmation, and how detected) could be identified. We assessed the relationship between time to first importation and overall Global Health Security Index (GHSI) using Cox regression. K-means clustering grouped countries according to healthcare capacity and health and demographic risk factors. ResultsA total of 13,201 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported by 48 countries in SSA during the 54 days following the first known introduction to the region. Out of the 2516 cases for which travel history information was publicly available, 1129 (44.9%) were considered importation events. At the regional level, imported cases tended to be male (65.0%), were a median 41.0 years old (Range: 6 weeks - 88 years), and most frequently had recent travel history from Europe (53.1%). The median time to reporting an introduction was 19 days; a countrys time to report its first importation was not related to GHSI, after controlling for air traffic. Countries that had, on average, the highest case fatality rates, lowest healthcare capacity, and highest probability of premature death due to non-communicable diseases were among the last to report any cases. ConclusionsCountries with systemic, demographic, and pre-existing health vulnerabilities to severe COVID-related morbidity and mortality are less likely to report any cases or may be reporting with limited public availability of information. Reporting on COVID detection and response efforts, as well as on trends in non-COVID illness and care-seeking behavior, is critical to assessing direct and indirect consequences and capacity needs in resource-constrained settings. Such assessments aid in the ability to make data-driven decisions about interventions, country priorities, and risk assessment. Key MessagesO_LIWe line-listed epidemiological indicators for the initial cases reported by 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa by reviewing and synthesizing information provided by official institutional outlets and news sources. C_LIO_LIOur findings suggest that countries with the largest proportions of untreated comorbidities, as measured by probability of premature death due to non-communicable diseases, and the fewest healthcare resources tended to not be reporting any cases at one-month post-introduction into the region. C_LIO_LIUsing data availability as a measure of gaps in detection and reporting and relating them to COVID-specific parameters for morbidity and mortality provides a measure of vulnerability. C_LIO_LIAccurate and available information on initial cases in seeding local outbreaks is key to projecting case counts and assessing the potential impact of intervention approaches, such that support for local data teams will be important as countries make decisions about control strategies. C_LI